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AMERICAN LAW AND POLICY ON 
ASSASSINATIONS OF FOREIGN LEADERS: 
THE PRACTICALITY OF MAINTAINING 
THE STATUS QUO 
NATHAN CANESTARO* 
Abstract: Suspending the ban on assassinations-as established in 
Executive Order 12333-serves no practical purpose. The Executive 
Order is not an obstacle to effective prosecution of the War on 
Terrorism; in fact, its reach is very limited. Although common sense 
might suggest that "assassination" equates with the targeted killing of a 
specific individual, the term is in fact a legal term of art with a very 
narrow definition derived from the Law of War. As a result, Executive 
Order 12333 only prohibits a very narrow spectrum of attacks in 
wartime or against clear threats to national security. As the United States 
has not typically engaged such means to attack "leadership targets" for 
several decades, publicly rescinding the offer now would grant no more 
freedom to act and only would serve to undermine the United States' 
public diplomacy abroad. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the rush to vengeance after the September II attacks, it has 
been seriously suggested by a number of advocates, including schol-
ars, journalists, and politicians, that the government remove all legal 
limitations on its use of assassination} They contend that the ability to 
eliminate key targets will be a necessary tool for our nation to prose-
cute its new war against terrorism. 
No standing Federal law criminalizes the assassination of a for-
eign official outside the boundaries of the United States. In the ab-
* Nathan Canestaro is a member of the Mghanistan Task Force, Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2001. Previously assigned to the CIA DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. J.D. Uni-
versity of Tennessee, 2001. The author would like to thank Troy Sacquety for his valuable 
assistance in proofreading and editing. This material has been reviewed by CIA. That re-
view neither constitutes CIA authentication of information nor implies their endorsement 
of the author's views. 
1 Daniel Schorr, Reviewing the Presidential Ban on Assassinations, NPR.org, at http:/ I 
www.npr.org/news/specials/response/essays/010917.schorrcommentary.html (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2002). 
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sence of such a statute, only Executive Order 12333 prohibits the act 
of state-sponsored killing.2 This Order, which was drafted in the mid-
1970s in the wake of revelations of government involvement in plots 
to kill several foreign leaders, has been maintained by every admini-
stration since President Ford. In recent years, however, there have 
been several attempts by Congress to override Executive Order 12333. 
The most recent of these initiatives is H.R. 19, the "Terrorist Elimina-
tion Act of 2001," proposed in January of this year by Representative 
Barr of Georgia.3 The findings section of this bill states: 
Past Presidents have issued Executive orders which severely 
limit the use of the military when dealing with potential 
threats against the United States of America; . . . these Ex-
ecutive orders limit the swift, sure, and precise action 
needed by the United States to protect our national security; 
present strategy allows the military to bomb large targets 
hoping to eliminate a terrorist leader, but prevents our 
country from designing a limited action which would 
specifically accomplish that purpose .... 4 
This paper will argue that any such legislation or other public 
revocation of the assassination ban would serve no practical purpose 
and will only injure the United States' ability to pursue its interests 
overseas during a time of international crisis. There is little utility to 
be found in retracting Executive Order 12333, as neither it nor inter-
national law pose any serious obstacle to the use of assassination in 
the scenarios in which the United States would typically employ it. As 
with any Executive Order, it may be revised, revoked, or temporarily 
suspended by the President. Furthermore, each successive administra-
tion has carved out exceptions to Executive Order 12333 that have 
narrowed the scope of its restrictions. 
The international legal prohibitions against assassination also do 
not present a significant obstacle to the use of assassination by the 
U.S. Government. International customary and treaty law does not 
prohibit the sort of open attacks generally employed by the United 
States when it strikes directly at foreign leaders. The United States has 
limited its use of deadly force in recent years to cases of international 
armed conflict or situations where there was a clear threat to national 
2 See Exec. Order No. 12,333,3 C.F.R. § 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) 
[hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,333]. 
s H.R. 19, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001). 
4Jd. 
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security that required action in self-defense. The laws of war control 
in both cases, giving the government much more legal freedom to 
apply deadly force than the body of law which regulates assassination 
during peacetime.5 Only in a narrow class of scenarios during times of 
conflict-such as attacks accomplished through treachery or by the 
placing of a price upon a target's head-would a killing be prohibited 
as an assassination under international law. 
A public retraction of the assassination ban also makes little sense 
from a policy perspective. The United States is straining to hold to-
gether a worldwide coalition against terrorism that includes moderate 
Islamic states and other nations with sizeable fundamentalist popula-
tions. Revoking Executive Order 12333 would only undermine the 
United States' moral position and damage the credibility of its public 
diplomacy at a time when both are critical to the pursuit of its na-
tional interests. Such a change would only further alienate the United 
States from these already suspicious, and even hostile, populaces that 
can directly affect the pursuit of American policy objectives. Retract-
ing Executive Order 12333 at such a sensitive time is especially point-
less considering that it is essentially symbolic in nature, serving mostly 
as a useful symbol of American moral policy, while doing little to ac-
tually restrict the use of force. 
In order to prove that a revocation of Executive Order 12333 
would cost the United States a great deal but result in virtually no 
gain, this article will first examine the treaties and conventions that 
form the international law regarding assassination in both peace and 
war times. Although common sense might suggest otherwise, the ex-
act meaning of the term "assassination" -especially during peace-
time-is open to considerable interpretative latitude, and there is lit-
tle legal agreement on a precise definition. This article will therefore 
try to define those circumstances in which a state-sanctioned killing 
would be considered a prohibited assassination. Finally, it will exam-
ine the nature and scope of the domestic ban on the practice from its 
initial development in the Ford Administration. This will be followed 
by a brief analysis of situations in which the United States has struck at 
foreign leaders in order to determine if the United States' typical 
5 Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State Sponsored Assassination During Peace and War, 5 
TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 231, 233-38 (1991); W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive 
Order 12333 and Assassination, 1989 ARMY LAW. 4, 7-8 (1989); Michael N. Schmitt, State 
Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. lNT'L L. 609, 618-51 
(1992). 
4 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:1 
strategies for the use of force are likely to run afoul of the current 
ban. 
It is important to note that the debate over the practicality and 
morality of assassination as a tool of national policy is beyond the 
scope of this analysis. Both are provocative and timely issues, with 
compelling arguments to be made on both sides. However, the weigh-
ing of those complex moral issues and political judgments are best left 
as an exercise for the conscience of the reader. 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAw ON AssAssiNATIONS IN WARTIME 
A. Definitions and History 
One of the primary challenges of any analysis of assassination is 
reaching a clear definition of the term. There is a remarkable lack of 
legal uniformity in its use, as different studies employ different inter-
pretations.6 For example, one leading law review article lists 11 sepa-
rate definitions in an effort to be comprehensive. 7 This lack of shared 
meaning is especially evident in an analysis of assassination during 
wartime, for it is here that a common sense understanding is the most 
misleading. The media's continuing misuse of the word could easily 
lead one to the conclusion that the specific, deliberate, and premedi-
tated killing of one particular person during wartime would qualifY as 
assassination. However, as explained below, such an act fails to qualifY 
as assassination because it is perfecdy legal under the laws of war. 8 In 
the context of armed conflict, the term applies only to a relatively 
narrow spectrum of killings where the death of one person is accom-
plished by means expressly prohibited by the international conven-
tions that regulate war.9 
The acceptability of assassination as a wartime strategy has per-
sisted for hundreds of years, but the formulation of a body of law 
dedicated to it only began during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.10 Earlier rules for the conduct of warfare had been based 
mosdy on Christian theology and focused on the requirements of a 
just war-jus ad bellum-in which Christians could participate with a 
6 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 611-12; Thomas C. Wingfield, Taking Aim at Regime Elites: As-
sassination, Tyrannicide, and the Clancy Doctrine, 22 Mn.J. INT'L L. & ThAnE 287, 306 (1999). 
7 Parks, supra note 5, at 8. 
8 /d. at5. 
9 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 632. 
10 Lieutenant Commander Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 
134 MIL. L. REv. 123, 126 (1991). 
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clear conscience.ll Beginning in the early modern period, however, 
these principles were to take a more secular shift. War began to be 
viewed and accepted as a natural tool of international politics, and the 
custom of waging it became more responsive to practical, rather than 
religious, requirements. 12 The law of armed conflict developed from 
the study of jus ad bellum to the formulation of a utilitarian customary 
law of war, jus in bello.13 Although these principles were not codified in 
any international treaties, they were widely recognized, and most 
combatants observed them as best they could unless military necessity 
dictated otherwise.14 Under these customary rules, an unprovoked 
killing in peacetime was considered immoral, but the assassination of 
a military leader during times of conflict was accepted as entirely le-
gitimate, and even praised as exemplary.l5 Some observers remarked 
on this apparent disparity; Voltaire was known to have quipped that 
"killing a man is murder unless you do it to the sound of trumpets. "16 
As the customary practice of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries clearly limited assassination to times of war, study of the sub-
ject focused not on when a leader could be killed, but instead on the 
manner in which it could be done. Great scholarly emphasis was 
placed on preserving the "honor of arms," a tradition that maintained 
that the death of an enemy commander could be engineered in any 
manner that was not treacherousP The studies of Hugo Grotius in 
1625 were characteristic of the developing utilitarian approach to the 
conduct of war, and his definition of treachery serves as one of the 
major influences on the historical precedent.18 He wrote that a lord 
could be attacked at any time and place, so long as the assassin 
breached no trust. 19 There was an important distinction, Grotius ar-
gued, between a death achieved through an impersonal attack, and 
one resulting from the treachery of those "who violate an express or 
tacit obligation of good faith, as subjects resorting to violence against 
a king, vassals against a lord, [and] soldiers against whom they serve 
11 MICHAEL HOWARD ET AL., THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE 
MoDERN WoRLD 2-3 (1994). 
12 /d. at 3. 
13 !d. at 87. 
14 !d. 
15 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 613-14. 
16 !d. at 610. 
17 Zengel, supra note 10, at 126-27. 
18 Beres, supra note 5, at 231 ( 1991). 
19 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 616. 
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.... "2° He also condemned the practice of offering a reward for the 
head of an enemy, or other means of "purchasing" victory, as such 
tactics encouraged treachery within the ranks.21 Held out as an exam-
ple of a legitimate killing was the act of Charlemagne's father, Pepin 
the Short, who swam across the Rhine to kill an enemy commander as 
he slept in his camp.22 In Grotius's opinion, this attack was not 
treacherous because the enemy prince did not know Pepin, and did 
not extend to him any trust or faith. 
Grotius also held that the waging of war was a natural right of 
kings, and suggested that the legal protections that shielded lords 
from treachery extended only as far as the sovereignty of the state.23 
In contrast, using treachery to kill robbers and pirates, who were 
without the protections of sovereignty, was more acceptable. Although 
not entirely free of moral blame, the practice went "unpunished 
among nations by reason of hatred of those against whom it is prac-
ticed."24 
B. Development and Application of the Modern Wartime Rule 
The development of a formal legal ban on assassination began 
with the codification of the international laws of war during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.25 Up until this time, the laws 
of armed combat remained mostly customary in nature, based upon 
broad principles of conduct suggested by theology and each nation's 
laws and military training.26 
The U.S. government was the first to formulate a legal code of 
military conduct that was to be issued to the troops in the field.27 Dur-
ing the Civil War, Secretary of War Edwin Stan ton solicited guidance 
and suggestions from a variety of scholars as to what form these regu-
lations should take, but left the task of writing them to Doctor Francis 
Lieber, a professor at Columbia University.28 Lieber's code was re-
viewed, amended, and finally issued by President Abraham Lincoln in 
20 Wingfield, supra note 6, at 300. 
21 See id. at 300-01; Zengel, supra note 10, at 127. 
22 Zengel, supra note 10, at 126-27. 
23 Id. at 127. 
24 Id. at 127(quoting H. GRonus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI ThEs (rev. ed. 1646), 
reprinted in 3(2) THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 653 (F. Kelsey trans.1925) ). 
25 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 628. 
26 HowARD, supra note 11, at 119. 
27 DONALD A. WELLS, THE LAWS OF LAND WARFARE: A GUIDE TO TilE u.s. ARMY FIELD 
MANUALS 1 (1992). 
28 Id. at xi. 
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1863 as The U.S. Army's General Orders #100. Five thousand copies 
were printed and distributed to the officers of the armies of both the 
Union and the Confederacy.29 Article 148 ofthe Order states: 
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individ-
ual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of 
the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without 
trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace 
allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors 
such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow the 
murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, 
made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with hor-
ror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as 
relapses into barbarism.30 
General Orders #100 further provided that soldiers may be killed as 
long as they are not individually singled out, or their deaths achieved 
as a result of a bounty placed upon their head.31 The most important 
difference of the code, however, was the substitution of outlawry for 
treachery as the definition of assassination. Within ten years, however, 
this concept was widely adopted, making the Lieber Code a model for 
the rules of war of other nations.32 
The formulation of a body of international treaty law that re-
stricts the practice of assassination began with the Brussels Confer-
ence of 1874. Although it was never ratified as a valid legal instrument 
by the United States,33 the declaration produced by this conference 
adopted a traditional view of the historical standard, denouncing any 
"treacherous attempt on the life of an enemy. "34 The declaration did 
not explicitly connect the practice of treachery with assassination, 
however. 
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 produced a 
number of major international instruments, including the Conven-
tion on the Law and Customs of War on Land.35 Although modeled 
on earlier works, this treaty was the first multinational codification of 
29 Id. at xiii. 
30 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Gen. Orders No. 
100, Apr. 24 1863, art. 148, available at http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts (last vis-
ited Oct. 28, 2001). 
!I Wells, supra note 27, at 99. 
! 2 See Zen gel, supra note 10, at 131. 
!! Wells, supra note 27, at 6. 
!4 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 629 (quoting TuE LAws oF WAR ON LAND (1880) (U.K.)). 
ll5 Wells, supra note 27, at 7. 
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the laws of land combat to be adopted. 36 Article 23 (b) of the annex to 
this convention stated that "[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means 
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited, it is especially forbidden ... to 
kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile na-
tion or army. "37 This article is now held to embody the customary rule 
of treachery,38 and is widely interpreted to re-link the practice of 
treachery with the act of assassination. 
Both the Hague IV Convention and the laws of war permit attacks 
upon valid military targets at any time or place.39 What is included in 
the category of "targets," however, is broader than just troops in the 
field. Noncombatants and civilians can be designated a valid target if 
they are sufficiently involved in the war effort.40 For example, any ci-
vilian who directly participates in hostilities would be equivalent, for 
targeting purposes, to a combatant. Although the exact level of in-
volvement necessary for a civilian to become a valid target has not 
been fully defined legally, 41 it is usually viewed as being a decision in 
practice based on context. Civilians who work directly to conduct the 
war, or occupy a role normally held by a soldier, are valid targets. 
There is also a legal consensus that a civilian head of state who serves 
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces falls within this category.42 
Other civilians who occupy positions of special importance or 
significance-such as weapons development-that are more valuable 
to their government in their current role than any contribution they 
could have made on the front lines, are similarly subject to attack.4!1 
It is important to note that the Article 23(b) ban on treachery 
does not preclude the use of either stealth or surprise, and does noth-
ing to change the basic rule that combatants are still legally subject to 
attack at any time or place.44 Modern revisions to the U.S. Army's field 
manual state that "[Article 23 (b)] does not preclude attacks on indi-
!!6 HowARD, supra note 11, at 121. 
57 Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, §§ 22, 
23 (b), available at http:/ /www.icrc.org/lliL.nsf/ 52d68d 14de6160e0c 12563da005fdb I b/ 
ldl726425f6955aecl2564le0038bfd6?0penDocument (last visited Oct. 28, 2001) [herein-
after Hague IV] . 
!18 Zengel, supra note 10, at 132 n.32. 
59 Parks, supra note 5, at 5. 
40 Id. at 6. 
41 Id. 
42 Boyd M.Johnson, Executive Order 12333: The Permissibility of an American Assassination 
of A Foreign Leader, 25 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 401, 418 n.ll3 (1992). 
45 Parks, supra note 5, at 6. 
44 Id. at 5. 
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vidual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostili-
ties, occupied territory, or elsewhere. "45 The annotations to the man-
ual also suggest that the most recent revisions to the principle are also 
"not [intended] to foreclose activity by resistance movements, para-
troops, and other belligerents who may attack individual persons. "46 
Scholars such as JM Spaight echo these conclusions, pointing out that 
"treachery must clearly be distinguished from dashes made at a ruler 
or commander by an individual or a little band of individuals who 
come as open enemies. "47 It must not, he continues, "be confounded 
with surprises, stratagems, or ambushes, which are allowable. "48 
Later conventions on the law of war have further defined and 
expanded modern treachery-based interpretations. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross's Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of12 August 1949, states in Article 37 of Protocol I: 
It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by re-
sort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary 
to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to 
accord, protection under the rules of international law ap-
plicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that 
confidence, shall constitute perfidy.49 
This additional rule takes the protections against assassination in Ar-
ticle 23(b) of the Hague IV Annex and expands them by adding 
perfidy as an entirely new component of prohibited treachery.5° 
Perfidy is the act of convincing the enemy he is protected under the 
laws of war, with the intent oflater betraying his confidences.51 Exam-
ples include a false indication of willingness to negotiate under truce 
or surrender flag, playing incapacity to fight by wounds, faking non-
combatant status, or falsifying other protected status by signs, em-
blems or uniforms-such as U.N. blue helmets.52 
45 Johnson, supra note 42, at 418 n.118. 
46 /d. at 419 n.114. 
47 /d. at 418 n.112. 
48 /d. 
49 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, art. 
37, Oct. 28 2001 available at http:/ /www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739 
003e636b/f6c8b9fee14 a77fdc125641e 0052 b079?0penDocument [hereinafter Geneva 
Protocol]. 
50 Zengel, supra note 10, at 139-40. 
5I Geneva Protocol, supra note 49, at art. 37. 
52 Seeid. at art. 37(a)-(d). 
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The United States has not ratified the Geneva Protocols, al-
though it recognizes many of the Protocol I declarations as either 
non-binding customary international law or otherwise generally ac-
ceptable practice.53 The United States military has instead built its 
modern codes of military conduct at least in part upon earlier prece-
dents. 54 It retained a Lieber-style ban on assassination as outlawry in 
the first revision of General Orders #100 in 1914, but listed it imme-
diately after the prohibition of treachery as if they were identical55- a 
dual approach which persisted into the 1934 revision.56 The Army's 
most recent draft of the manual, 1956's The Law of Land Warfare, in-
corporates both definitions into a single heading, and includes verba-
tim Hague IV's restriction on "kill[ing] or wound[ing] treacher-
ously."57 The military's accompanying operational law handbooks also 
reflect the Lieber rule of assassination, stating that "hiring assassins, 
putting a price on the enemy's head, and offering rewards for an en-
emy 'dead or alive'" is prohibited."58 The handbook continues, how-
ever, by noting that this principle does not preclude singling out en-
emy commanders for attack. 59 
From the above, a number of conclusions can be drawn about 
what attacks against specific individuals during wartime are assassina-
tions, and thus prohibited under the laws of armed conflict. First, the 
applicable law, as established in the treaty and customary law that 
regulates the use of force, primarily serves to narrow the methods by 
which individuals can be attacked. Combatants may engage any valid 
target at any place and time, but assassinations are only those killings 
of targets that are accomplished by "treacherous" means-as defined 
by Article 23(b) of the Annex to the Hague IV Convention-or alter-
natively accomplished through "outlawry," as first defined by the Lie-
ber Code.oo 
It is important to note, however, that killings that are not assassi-
nations may be illegal for other reasons. The laws of war place a num-
ber of restrictions upon the use of force generally, such as the re-
55 INT'L AND 0PERAT'L LAw DEP'TMENT, U.S. ARMY juDGE Anvoc. GEN. Sen., LAw oF 
WAR WoRKSHOP MANUAL 7-3 (CDR Brian J. Bill, USN, ed., 1999) [hereinafter WoRKSHOP 
MANUAL] (on file with author). 
54 Wells, supra note 27, at 100--01. 
55 Id. at 101. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
ss WoRKSHOP MANUAL, supra note 53, at 7-33. 
59 Id.; Parks, supra note 5, at 4. 
60 See Parks, supra note 5, at 5; WoRKSHOP MANUAL, supra note 53, at 7-32. 
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quirement that every attack must reflect the basic requirements of 
military necessity, proportionality, and discrirnination.6I Furthermore, 
the combat death of a noncombatant, if not an assassination, could 
still be illegal under other laws prohibiting the unnecessary infliction 
of civilian casualties.62 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAw oN AssASSINATIONS IN PEACETIME 
A. Definitions and Principle 
Assassination during peacetime has been generally interpreted to 
mean the killing of a particular individual for political reasons.63 As a 
formal crime, however, it is still difficult to define precisely. Many 
scholars believe it to be a subset of murder, with the choice to kill mo-
tivated by politics, and the particular target selected because of his 
identity, prominence, or public status.64 Other observers, such as Ma-
jor Schmitt, also differentiate assassination from murder, but base the 
distinction on the international protection accorded to the victim and 
the usually transnational character of the act.65 Senior military lawyers 
have drawn a slightly different conclusion, suggesting that the distinc-
tion between assassination and murder lies not only in the motive, but 
also in the covert nature of the attack.66 
If there is one characteristic generally included in the definition, 
it is assassination's political nature. An application of this as a legal 
requirement is problematic, however, as political motive is not an ab-
solute and is based largely on perception and context. Those who 
employ state-sponsored killing will deny they were motivated by poli-
tics, while those who are victimized will argue the opposite.67 It is in-
evitable that states will characterize their actions to meet their own 
purposes,68 as the line between violent political activism and wanton 
bloodshed can be exceptionally narrow at times. As Major Schmitt 
suggests, "[O]ne man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."69 
61 WoRKSHOP MANUAL, supra note 53, at 7-4, 7-5; Schmitt, supra note 5, at 640-41. 
62 See Parks, supra note 5, at 4-5. 
63 Parks, supra note 5, at 4; Schmitt, supra note 5, at 625. 
64 MURRAY CLARK HAVENS ET AL., THE POLITICS OF AsSASSINATION 3 (1970); see also 
FRANKLIN L. FORD, POLITICAL MURDER: FROM TYRANNICIDE TO 'IERRORISM 1-3 (1985). 
65 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 627-28. 
66 Parks, supra note 5, at 4. 
67 See Wingfield, supra note 6, at 306. 
68 I d. 
69 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 625. 
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The principle of assassination as political activity is also no longer 
applicable once war begins. As Carl von Clausewitz suggested: "War is 
a continuation of political activity by other means" -a theory that 
leads one to believe that in war, every killing is a political one. 70 A 
strict application of the peacetime political requirement would then 
render every wartime death an assassination,71 a conclusion not 
reflected either by the laws of war or the common understanding of 
the word. To further complicate matters, the line between wartime 
and peacetime legal standards for assassination blur together in the 
face of conflicts less than war, such as self-defense, preemptive self-
defense, and counterterrorist operations. Because the peacetime and 
wartime bodies of law are so dramatically different in effect and appli-
cation, any analysis of assassination must concentrate on how to de-
termine which applies. 
B. The U.N. and the Use of Force in Peacetime 
At least in principle, there is manifest evidence to suggest that 
peacetime assassination has been illegal since the Middle Ages. 72 A 
vast body of domestic and international law clearly states that the kill-
ing of any person is prohibited, regardless of underlying political mo-
tivations. Murder has been criminalized in all of the world's major 
domestic legal systems, and a sea of human rights accords speak to the 
value and sanctity accorded to human life in international law. The 
severity of murder as a criminal offence is especially evident in its in-
clusion as a prominent offense in each of the major international ex-
tradition treaties. 73 
Although the indications are overwhelming that international 
law condemns the practice of assassination in principle, beyond the 
domestic criminalization of murder, there is little concrete interna-
tional law that specifically forbids it. Only the Organization of Mrican 
Unity (OAU) Charter outlaws assassination by name,74 while the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York 
Convention) protects against it under limited circumstances.75 This 
70 Id. at 639. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 613-14. 
73 See id. at 621-23. 
74 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 618 n.37. 
75 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 14 Dec. 1973, art. 2, reprinted in United 
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Convention, which was ratified by nearly half the world's nations and 
most major powers, criminalizes "the international commission of ... 
murder, kidnapping, or other attack upon the person or liberty of an 
internationally protected person. "76 However, it only accords protec-
tion to figures traveling abroad, and not in their home states. 77 
In a more general sense, Article 4 of the U.N. Charter establishes 
a right to be free from aggression and the use of international armed 
force, and has been interpreted to provide that citizens of a nation 
have a right to be immune from international acts of violence by citi-
zens or military forces of other nations.7B "Article 2(4): All Members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations."79 This statement of high moral principle has been 
accepted as customary international law, as suggested by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States. The court found, 
quoting from the work of the International Law Commission, that Ar-
ticle 2 ( 4) is a "conspicuous example of a rule in in ternationallaw hav-
ing the character of jus cogens. "80 The assassination of a foreign leader 
in peacetime with no provocation would therefore be a prima facie vio-
lation of basic international law, as well as murder under the applica-
ble domestic criminal statute. 
There are, however, two established scenarios in which the Article 
2(4) protections against the use of force would be suspended. The 
first is a military action sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and the second is an attack made by 
a victim state in self-defense.81 The right to self-defense is provided to 
all states in Article 51 of the Charter:"Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Oct. 28, 2001, available at 
http:/ /www.undcp.org /terrorism_convention_protected_persons.html. 
76 !d. at art. 2, § 1. 
77 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 619 n.44. 
78 Parks, supra note 5, at 4; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
79 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
80 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, para. 190 (june 
27), available at http:/ /www.gwu.edu/-jaysmith /nicus3.html [hereinafter Nicaragua] (last 
visited October 28, 2001). 
81 INT'L AND 0PER'L LAw DEP'T, U.S. ARMY juDGE Aovoc. GEN. Sen., OPERATIONAL 
LAw HANDBOOK 2-3, (Maj. Mike 0. Lacey & Cdr. Brian J. Bill eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
OPERATIONAL LAW]. 
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until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. "82 
When a nation employs Article 51 to justify a use of force in its 
own defense, or the defense of another state, the laws of war control 
as they would in any formally declared conflict. Therefore, under an 
Article 51 action, any state-sanctioned killing by a victim state would 
not be an assassination so long as it is not accomplished by treachery 
or outlawry, as described earlier. 
C. The Boundaries of "The Inherent Right to Self-Defense" 
Although Article 51 has been accorded the status of customary 
law, the exact breadth of what is included in the "inherent right [of 
individual nations to] ... self-defence"83 remains controversial and 
subject to multiple interpretations. No specific definition of "self-
defense" or "armed attack" is provided in the text, forcing legal schol-
ars to look elsewhere for guidance on how the term should be inter-
preted. The only evidence customary international law provides as to 
its scope arises from a little-known international dispute between the 
United States and Great Britain.84 Known as the Caroline Case, this 
precedent arose from an 1837 incident in which British troops 
launched an attack into the United States to destroy a ship, the Caro-
line, that had been moving arms and volunteers to Canadian seces-
sionists.85 U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster rebuffed British 
claims that the attack was justified, responding with a description of 
the circumstances when a right to self-defense could be recognized: 
It will be for [the British] to show a necessity of self-defence, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation. It will be for it to shew [sic], also, 
that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the ne-
cessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territo-
ries of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or 
excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-
82U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
8!1 Id. 
84 Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Seriously: Did the United States Violate Interna-
tional Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush1, 28 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 
569, 569(1995). 
85 See id. at 575-76. 
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defence, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly 
within it.86 
15 
Over time, Caroline's requirements-an imminent threat, a necessary 
action, a proportionate response, and the exhaustion of peaceful 
means87-came to define the customary standard for anticipatory self-
defense, a status which was further reinforced with its use by the In-
ternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946.88 
Caroline does provide some guidance as to the scope of Article 51, 
but the breadth of its three factors still remains subject to the same 
range of different interpretations. Scholars such as Major Schmitt 
suggested that the imminence requirement is a "relative criterion";89 
in judging whether it is met, a state should weigh the severity of the 
threat before taking any preemptive action.90 The greater the threat, 
the more legally acceptable an anticipatory strike becomes.91 How-
ever, the author notes that this "sliding scale" analysis may fail with 
terrorism due to the difficulty of tracking and locating these groups 
before they attack.92 Terrorists who "go to ground" may be impossible 
to locate and eliminate until it is too late; missing an opportunity to 
remove a threat could prevent the victim state from responding until 
after the attack has been carried out.93 With September II fresh on 
the minds of the world's governments, however, and the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction looming large, in practice most states 
will likely err toward striking earlier in order to preserve their own 
security rather than waiting until later in order to secure more legal 
justification. 
Even though the historical events that precipitated Caroline in-
volved a preemptive strike to defuse an imminent threat of a direct 
armed attack, some observers-including a minority of nations and 
the United Nations itself-continue to assert that Article 51 does not 
allow states to act in self-defense until an actual attack occurs.94 They 
insist that the Article's requirement of an "armed attack" should be 
interpreted to mean that a state could only respond to a threat in the 
86 Id. at 577. 
s7 Id. 
88 Johnson, supra note 42, at 578-79. 
89 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 64 7-48. 
90 Id .. 
91 Id. at 647. 
92 Id. at 648. 
93 Id. 
94 OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 3. 
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case of an actual physical invasion by one state into the territory of 
another.95 Construing the right more liberally, they argue, would run 
counter to the clear language in the Charter and would be counter-
productive to the United Nations' goal of peaceful resolution of dis-
putes and the maintenance of international order.96 
The specter of terrorism poses the most serious challenge to this 
narrow interpretation of Article 51. Most major governments assert 
that they can employ the requirements of Caroline to justify an attack 
against threats to their security, including actions inside the states that 
harbor or encourage such organized groups.97 A close reading of the 
Caroline requirements does not contradict this proposition, especially 
since that case involved an anticipatory attack into the territory of an-
other state which was harboring insurgents. Although academics who 
support the more limited view continue to dispute the legitimacy of 
this viewpoint, it seems naive to suggest that when nuclear, biological, 
or chemical (NBC) weapons are available to terrorist groups, a poten-
tial victim state must wait until an attack occurs before it can respond 
to a threat. Waiting for an actual strike could cost a victim nation 
hundreds or perhaps thousands of lives, or even eliminate the capac-
ity of the victim state to respond at all. 
Advocates of a broader view, which include the majority of na-
tions and the United States, counter that a limited interpretation does 
not adequately reflect the nature of modern warfare and terrorism.98 
They insist this narrow view of Article 51 ignores the historical weak-
nesses of the Security Council and the practical reality that no state 
will accept being forced to wait until it is attacked before it is allowed 
to protect itself.99 Requiring states to strictly comply with a narrow in-
terpretation would effectively "impose paralysis"100 on them. The ma-
jority view, in contrast, only requires that the customary rule, as 
defined in Caroline, be satisfied before a state may legitimately act to 
eliminate a threat.101 Such an approach would not limit a state to re-
sponding only to an "armed attack," and would allow preemptive de-
95 /d. 
96 /d. 
97 /d. at 3-4. 
98 Beres, supra note 5, at 239. 
99Jd. 
100 Bert Brandenburg, The Legality of Assassination as an Aspect of Foreign Policy, 27 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 655,668 n.88 (1987). 
101 /d. at 238-39. 
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fensive measures against an imminent or continuing threat that has 
not yet resulted in an attack.I02 
Supporters of the broad Article 51 view also point to the vast 
body of other law that justifies an anticipatory attack against a third-
party nation who is harboring a threat. Various sources indicate that a 
state has a duty to prevent its territory from being used as a base for 
hostile acts of third parties against another nation.103 The U.S. Su-
preme Court established a "due diligence" standard in United States v. 
A1jonal04 in 1887, stating that "[t]he law of nations requires every na-
tional government to use due diligence to prevent a wrong being 
done within its own dominion to another nation with which it is at 
peace, or to the people thereof."105 Other secondary sources, such as 
Vattels' Law of Nations, further indicate that states which support ter-
rorists who threaten other states may lawfully be targeted: 
If, then, there is anywhere a nation of restless and mischie-
vous disposition, ever ready to injure others, to traverse their 
designs, and to excite domestic disturbances in their domin-
ions ... it is not doubted that all the others have a right to 
form a coalition in order to repress and chastise that nation, 
and to put it for ever after out of her power to injure 
them.106 
These views seem incompatible with the United Nations' strict inter-
pretation of Article 51 and Caroline, and add further credence to the 
suggestion that the weight of international law supports a more 
flexible definition. 
Two other approaches suggest alternatives to relying solely on 
Article 51 to define what level of violence is needed to activate the 
right to self-defense. The first of these relies upon the U.N. Charter's 
definition of "aggression" to replace its lack of guidance on the mean-
ing of "armed attack. "107 Under this theory, the two terms are re-
garded as roughly synonymous, with any use of aggression against a 
member of the United Nations invoking the victim's Article 51 right 
to employ armed force in self-defense: 
1o2 Johnson, supra note 42, at 420 n.123. 
103 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: 
Terrorism, the Law and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 99-105 (1989). 
104 United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887). 
105 Sofaer, supra note 103, at 103 n.35. 
106 Beres, supra note 5, at 248 n.73. 
107 Teplitz, supra note 84, at 614. 
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The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of 
the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of 
aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity 
with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act 
of aggression has been committed would not be justified in 
the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact 
that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of 
sufficient gravity.108 
The Charter provides that any first use of violence is prima facie evi-
dence of aggression. It also provides a non-exhaustive list of specific 
examples, which includes the use of any kind of weapon to attack the 
territory of another state, blockading the ports or coasts of another 
state, attacking the armed forces of another state, allowing its territory 
to be used by a third state to commit acts of aggression against an-
other state, or sending armed groups to attack another state.I09 These 
examples suggest that aggression includes all "direct and indirect" 
methods of attack or any other complicit involvement which incites 
international conflict.110 Under this approach, a state who was a victim 
of an act of aggression would be permitted by Article 51 in acting in 
self-defense, regardless of whether the conditions for such defense 
had been met. 
The International Court of Justice has also proposed that there 
may be acceptable defensive measures that fall below the threshold of 
Article 51. In Nicaragua v. United States, the court acknowledged that 
activities that do not rise to the level of an armed attack could still 
"constitute a breach of the principle of the non-use of force ... that 
is, a form of conduct that is certainly wrongful, but is lesser gravity 
than an armed attack. "lll The Court implies that a lesser use of pro-
vocative force could justify "proportionate counter measures" by the 
victim state.l12 This suggests that a nation facing some threat that does 
not rise to the level of an armed attack could still respond with a 
lesser, but undefined, degree of force. 
108 G.A Res. 3314, Definition of Aggmsion, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, 
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), available at http:/ /jurist. law.pitt.edu/3314.htm (last visited 
October 29, 2001). 
109 Teplitz, supra note 84, at 615. 
no Sofaer, supra note 103, at 93. 
m Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. 14 at para. 249. 
112 Teplitz, supra note 84, at 616 n.397. 
2003] Law & Policy Regarding the Assassination of Foreign Leaders 19 
III. AssASSINATION IN AMERICAN Poucv AND LAw 
A. The Cold War and the Church Committee 
In order to understand the nature and scope of the U.S. Federal 
ban on assassinations and the degree to which it restricts the military 
options of the President, it is necessary to examine the circumstances 
of its origin. Reading the language of the rule-now in effect as' Ex-
ecutive Order 12333113--one could easily conclude that it prevents the 
United States from employing deadly force against foreign leaders. 
However, a legal and historical analysis of this document suggests that 
it is far less prohibitive than it might at first appear. It fails to actually 
bar state-sponsored assassination for two major reasons. First, in re-
cent years the Order has been interpreted to allow the types of attacks 
against foreign leaders that the United States has typically favored. 
Second, an executive order does not have the force and immutability 
oflaw, and is subject to change by the President. As a result, Executive 
Order 12333 is not an effective legal obstacle to assassination, but 
rather is only a visible symbol of policy and a mechanism to ensure 
that the authority to initiate an assassination attempt resides with the 
President alone.ll4 
Executive Order 12333 and its predecessors indirectly arose from 
the November 1975 investigation by the Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations. Led by Senator Frank Church, the com-
mittee was charged with uncovering government operations that were 
"illegal, improper, or unethical."ll5 Responding to continued allega-
tions that the U.S. intelligence committee had plotted to end the lives 
of several foreign leaders during the 1950s and 1960s, the Church 
Committee launched an extensive investigation that culminated in 
sixty days of formal hearings and more than 8,000 pages of sworn tes-
timony.116 In its 346-page report, the committee concluded that the 
United States was indeed involved in five different assassination 
plots.117 In the two most serious cases, CIA officials were found to have 
actively worked to kill Patrice Lumumba, the Premier of the Congo, 
m Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 2, at§ 200. 
114 Parks, supra note 5, at 8; Zengel, supra note 10, at 146--47. 
115 ALLEGED AssASSINATION PLOTS AGAINST FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No. 94-465, at 
1 (1975) (hereinafter CHURCH REPORT]. 
116 !d. at 2. 
117 !d. at 4 n.l. 
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and Cuban Leader Fidel Castro.t18 In three other incidents-involving 
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dihn Diem of South 
Vietnam, and Rene Schneider of Chile-the U.S. government was not 
held directly responsible for the actual killings, but did support the 
coups that brought about their deaths,l19 
Especially disturbing to the Church Committee were the internal 
machinations that produced these plots. On several occasions its 
members were unable to determine where the authorization to begin 
an operation had actually originated. Government officials main-
tained "plausible deniability" against internal investigations by using 
ambiguous and often evasive language to discuss sensitive operational 
matters and by employing broad imprecision in the wording of their 
orders. The Committee concluded that these sorts of practices led to 
confusion about the original intent behind the mission goals and cre-
ated a breakdown in the accountability of elected government and 
appointed officials,l2° This deliberate obfuscation of the evidence, 
they continued, was detrimental to the legitimate process of authori-
zation and undermined principles of democratic accountability,121 In 
the intelligence community, the problem was serious enough that an 
assassination plot could be proposed, developed, and carried out 
without ever receiving presidential authorization. 
In their findings, the Church Committee stated that in the ab-
sence of war, assassination should be rejected as a tool of American 
foreign policy. The practice was "incompatible with American princi-
ple, international order, and morality, "122 it reasoned, and violated the 
"moral precepts fundamental to our way of life. "123 The Committee 
also suggested that it was probably inevitable that any plot hatched by 
U.S. officials would eventually be revealed because of the demon-
strated inability of a democratic government to keep secrets,l24 Re-
gardless of the success of the actual plot, such a disclosure would seri-
ously harm U.S. foreign relations and incite retaliatory attempts on 
the lives of U.S. officials.125 The Committee concluded that the dam-
118 /d.; Jonathan M. Fredman, Policy And Law: Covert Action, Loss of Life, and the Prohibi-
tion on Assassination, 1976-96, in 40 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: STUDIES IN INTELLI-
GENCE 2, 2 (1996) (on file with author). 
119 See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 115, at 4-5. 
120 /d. 
121 /d. at 6-7. 
122 /d. at I. 
128 !d. at 257. 
124 CHURCH REPORT, supra note 115, at 281-82. 
125 !d. at 282. 
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age from such revelations "to American foreign policy, to the good 
name and reputation of the United States abroad, to the American 
people's faith and support of its foreign government and its foreign 
policy, is incalculable. "126 The Committee hinted, however, that in 
cases of imminent danger threatening the nation, assassination could 
still be considered a viable option.127 The Committee found that of all 
the targets plotted against by the CIA, only Castro ever posed such a 
threat, and only then, during the Cuban missile crisis.12s 
The Church Committee also remarked on the difficulty of killing 
any foreign leader and on the difficulty of reliably generating a pro-
ductive result from such a plot.129 A leader eliminated for his anti-U.S. 
bias could potentially be replaced by a successor even less accommo-
dating to American interests. In addition, the instability and political 
upheaval resulting from a foreign official's death could prove to be 
even more detrimental to the United States then the original leader 
ever was.130 
In order to prevent similar abuses in the future, the Committee 
recommended that a statute be enacted "which would make it a 
criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States (1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassi-
nate a foreign official; (2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official; 
or (3) to assassinate a foreign official. "131 By the time the Committee 
had come to this conclusion, two successive Directors of Central Intel-
ligence-Helms in 1972, and Colby in 1973-had already circulated 
memos instructing Agency personnel not to undertake or support 
such plots.m With remarkable foresight, the Committee predicted 
why these measures were not sufficient and why legislation would be 
necessary: 
Commendable and welcome as they are, these CIA directives 
are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors 
change, and someday in the future what was tried in the past 
may once again be a temptation .... Laws express our na-
tion's values; they deter those who might be tempted to ig-
126 /d. at 258. 
127 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 658. 
128 CHURCH REPORT, supra note 115, at 258. 
129 /d. at 281-82. 
130 /d. 
m !d. at283. 
u2 Johnson, supra note 42, at 407 nn.33-35. 
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nore those values and stiffen the will of those who want to 
resist .... 133 
Several subsequent efforts to enact such a law-in 1976, 1977, and 
1980-have all failed.134 
Even by the time the Church Committee had completed its inves-
tigation, political forces had begun to mobilize to address the prob-
lem. In 1976, after first making several public statements which 
affirmed his commitment not to use assassination, President Gerald 
Ford issued Executive Order 11905, in which section 5 provided: 
"[N]o employee of the United States shall engage in, or conspire to 
engage in political assassination. "135 The Order contained no 
definitions section, as would be expected in a legislative act, or any 
other elaboration of what constituted assassination. Executive Order 
11905 also did not address the permissibility of other types of poten-
tially lethal activities, such as support to coup attempts or paramilitary 
operations, although it did state that the Order did "not authorize any 
activity not previously authorized and not provide exemption from 
any restriction otherwise applicable. "136 Despite these shortcomings, 
the Order was widely interpreted as prohibiting the types of activities 
revealed by the Church report-specifically, peacetime efforts by U.S. 
intelligence agency officials to cause the deaths of foreign heads of 
states whose activities were considered detrimental to the interests of 
the United States}37 
Within two years, Executive Order 11905 was revised}38 In 1978, 
President Carter broadened the scope of the ban, newly numbered 
Executive Order 12306,139 by adding the phrase "those acting on be-
half of the United States," to the text and deleting the word "politi-
cal. "140 The "acting" language in the new Order was interpreted to 
correct the lack of guidance on the permissibility of coup plotting. 
President Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
however, in recent years has publicly stated that this interpretation was 
1' 5 CHURCH REPORT, supra note 115, at 282-83. 
1M See johnson, supra note 42, at 409-11. 
l!l5 Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. § 90 (1976), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). 
1!6Jd. 
1!7 SeeZengel, supra note 10, at 145. 
1!18 Fredman, supra note 119, at 2. 
159 Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. § 112 (Jan. 24, 1978), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 
(1979). 
uo Fredman, supra note 119, at 2. 
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not what the President had intended,l41 President Carter reportedly 
did not mean to prevent the United States from supporting a coup if 
the prospect of the leader's death could not be ruled out, but instead 
wanted only to remove any requirement that planners should 
affirmatively know beforehand whether the leader's death would re-
sult.142 
B. The Advantages of Using an Executive Order to Prohibit Assassinations 
In reality, contemporary critics have suggested Executive Order 
11905 likely prohibited assassination in general terms primarily in or-
der to resolve political pressure to correct the problem and to serve as 
a visible symbol of policy.l43 Others suspect that the Order may have 
preempted actual legislation that would have been much more 
specific and prohibitive-and thus harmful to the military and intelli-
gence capabilities of the United States.l44 
Part of the advantage of employing an executive order to pro-
hibit assassinations is its inherent flexibility. Although each order has 
the effect of law, they are not immutable, and allow the President a 
variety of ways to circumvent them. The President has the authority to 
overrule the order, make an exception to it, or ask Congress to legis-
late its removal.145 Additionally, the President may designate any of 
these changes as classified if he considers them "intelligence activities 
... or intelligence sources and methods," effectively preventing them 
from ever reaching public view.l46 
The executive order ban on assassinations may also be bypassed 
through a number of other executive actions. First, the President may 
ask Congress to declare war.l47 As stated above, during wartime, a dif-
ferent body of law is used to define assassination, under which the 
President has much greater legal latitude to strike at foreign leaders 
as combatants. Second, the President may invoke the United States' 
Article 51 rights to self-defense,148 an act which authorizes the use of 
force equivalent to a declaration of war. Finally, the President could 
exercise his executive discretion to interpret the order narrowly, free-
141 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 663. 
142 Id. 
14! Zen gel, supra note 10, at 145. 
144 Seeid. 
145 Johnson, supra note 42, at 403. 
146 Id. at 427 n.165. 
147 Id. at 403 n.13. 
148 Id. at 403 n.14. 
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ing him to authorize activities which potentially could result in a 
leader's death, but do not explicitly call for it.l49 
So many options exist to get around the ban that many observers 
have suggested that Executive Order 11905 and its successors are 
mostly symbolic in function, doing little to actually restrict the use of 
force.1 50 In a public memorandum of law, senior military lawyers came 
to a similar conclusion, finding that Executive Order 12333 does not 
limit action in wartime or restrict self-defense action during peace-
time against legitimate threats to the national security of the United 
States.151 Therefore, the Order should not be viewed as a practical 
ban, but instead as a preventive measure to stop unilateral actions by 
officials within the government and a guarantee that the authority to 
order assassinations lies with the President alone.152 
C. Executive Order 12333 and Schultz's "Active Defense" 
In 1981, President Reagan issued the most recent version of the 
ban, Executive Order 12333. This new Order, which remains in effect 
today, retained President Carter's wording, but added a section that 
prohibits indirect assassination by members of the intelligence com-
munity.l53 It was the Reagan administration's use of force in response 
to terrorism, however, not the minor revisions in the Order itself, that 
proved to be more significant. On April15, 1986, U.S. Air Force F-111 
fighter-bombers struck three targets in Libya in retaliation for a Lib-
yan-plotted terrorist attack at a Berlin nightclub that had killed a U.S. 
servicemen and wounded over two hundred others. One of these tar-
gets, the El Azziziya Barracks, was reportedly known by American in-
telligence to be the home and headquarters of Libyan leader Colonel 
Muammar Qadhafi. Although he was not present at the time of the 
attack, his wife and two sons were injured, and his young adopted 
daughter was killed.l54 
Press scrutiny of the raid revealed considerable evidence suggest-
ing that the attack was intended to kill Qadhafi.155 The strike targets 
were close to his tent-which was in the corner of a very large open 
149 See id. at 403 n.15. 
150 Johnson, supra note 42, at 40; Parks, supra note 5, at 8; Zengel, supra note 10, at 
146. 
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courtyard156-and the United States supposedly sought intelligence 
on his location right up until the night of the attack.l57 According to 
reporter Seymour Hersh, nine of the eighteen bombers employed in 
the raid had a specific mission to target Qadhafi and his family.t5s As 
one Air Force intelligence officer put it: "There's no question they 
were looking for Qadhafi. It was briefed that way. They were going to 
kill him. "159 Additionally, administration officials were instructed be-
fore the raid to prepare briefs that distinguished how Qadhafi's hypo-
thetical death in the pending attack was not an assassination}6° Fur-
thermore, language announcing his demise was reportedly prepared 
for the President's speech that evening}6t 
In response to these accusations, the Reagan administration ar-
gued that the raid did not violate Executive Order 12333, and strenu-
ously denied that Qadhafi was even a target. "We weren't out to kill 
anybody," said the President, although he doubted that "any of us 
would have shed tears" if Qadhafi had indeed died.162 Meanwhile, sen-
ior administration officials hastily categorized the raid as a legitimate 
Article 51 self-defense operation to the United Nations, sharing U.S. 
intelligence which conclusively linked Libya to the Berlin attack and 
revealed that as many as thirty more attacks were being planned.163 
While the State Department invoked Article 51 to satisfy interna-
tional law, White House legal counsel Abraham D. Sofaer argued that 
the strike fell within a loophole in Executive Order 12333. Qadhafi 
was not a target of the raids, Sofaer reasoned, but if he merely hap-
pened to be present at one of the facilities that was bombed, his death 
would not be an assassination-just a consequence of the raid.l64 A 
leader's position, Sofaer opined, does not legally immunize him from 
the effects of being present at a valid military target that is being at-
tacked.165 Effectively, this reasoning reflected the law of armed 
conflict as it applies to non-combatants166-a legitimate defense if 
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there was indeed a state of armed conflict or a continuing threat 
against the United States that merited a preemptive act of self-
defense. 
Secretary of State George Schultz, who had openly complained 
that the United States had responded to terrorism by becoming "the 
Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to re-
spond, "167 strongly supported this argument. In a public address, he 
asserted the U.S. government would have to prepare an "active de-
fense" to counter the rise in terrorism the future would bring.l68 His 
statements were more than mere rhetoric-they were a glimpse of a 
persistent policy trend that would remain through the next three 
presidential administrations. Secretary Schultz predicted, "We can 
expect more terrorism directed at our strategic interests around the 
world in the years ahead. To combat it, we must be willing to use mili-
tary force. "169 What is needed to undermine the growing threat of ter-
rorism, Secretary Schultz proposed, was a doctrine of active interven-
tionsm: 
We must reach a consensus in this country that our re-
sponses should go beyond passive defense to consider means 
of active prevention, pre-emption, and retaliation. Our goal 
must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and expe-
rience has taught us over the years that one of the best de-
terrents of terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure 
measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We 
should take steps towards carrying out those measures. 
There should be no moral confusion on the issue. Our aim 
is not to seek revenge but to put an end to violent attacks 
against innocent people, to make the world a safer place to 
live for all of us. Clearly the democracies have a moral right, 
indeed a duty, to defend themselvesP0 
In his remarks, Secretary Schultz also stated that there were cases 
where international rules and traditional practices did not apply, and 
that the free nations cannot afford to let the "Orwellian corruption of 
language hamper our efforts to defend ourselves, our interests, and 
our friends. "171 
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D. Post Cold War: From Saddam to September 11 
Although the Cold War was not yet over, the Libyan raid became 
the model military action and legal precedent upon which many post-
cold war attacks would be based. The lines between formal war and 
peace were no longer clear-the United States had indicated its in-
tent to use deadly force against foreign leaders, even in peacetime, 
should they pose a threat to the nation. The use of more overt meth-
ods such as an airstrike, however, marked a shift away from the cloak-
and-dagger schemes of the Cold War. Instead of covertly working to 
end a leader's life, America would strike openly, with gun camera 
footage visible to all on CNN the next day. 
This strategy was to be employed against Iraqi dictator Saddam 
Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War. As part of the air campaign lead-
ing up to the ground war, coalition strike aircraft hit 580 command 
and control sites from which Saddam might control his forces and 
another 260 "leadership targets" that included his palaces and other 
buildings he was known to frequent_l72 Publicly, senior American 
leaders continued to deny that Saddam was an official target of the 
campaign. General Norman Schwartzkopf stated repeatedly that the 
United States does not "have a policy of trying to kill any particular 
individual, "173 but President George Bush was more ambivalent: 
"We're not in the position of targeting Saddam Hussein," he com-
mented, "but no one will weep for him when he is gone. "174 Admini-
stration officials were so sensitive to the suggestion that they were tar-
geting Saddam that Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney fired Air 
Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan, who had the poor judgment to 
boast that the United States would "'decapitate' Iraqi leadership by 
targeting Saddam, his family, and even his mistress. "175 
Mter the war, however, individual generals were more forthcom-
ing. General Charles Horner, the Commander of the U.S. Ninth Air 
Force and one of the major engineers of the air war, was quoted as 
saying, "As a matter of policy we were not trying to assassinate [Sad-
dam] but we dropped bombs on every place that he should have been 
at work ... that's ... getting kind of fancy with words but in reality 
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that's the truth of the matter. "176 The General continued by explain-
ing that U.S. aircraft were actively hunting down the Winnebagos the 
Iraqi dictator was using as mobile command posts,l77 On one occa-
sion, one of Hussein's groups ofWinnebagos was reportedly attacked 
by U.S. A-10 strike aircraft, which destroyed several vehicles but nar-
rowly missed the dictator himsel£.178 Although Horner's comments 
belie his lack of understanding of the laws of war as they apply to as-
sassination, these attacks were nonetheless perfectly legal. Open 
strikes by cruise missiles and bombers against Saddam, a combatant in 
his role as the Commander in Chief of the Iraqi Army, were neither 
treacherous nor outlawry, and thus were valid. Furthermore, under 
international law, the coalition's UN Security Council resolution 
authorizing the use of force, the Iraqi armed invasion of Kuwait, and 
the Iraqi abduction of over 3,500 American hostages, add more legal 
legitimacy to the United States' claims that the war was a valid self-
defense action on behalf of Kuwait. Additionally, even if Saddam had 
been killed by one of these raids, it would not be an assassination un-
der Executive Order 12333, as the attacks fell under President 
Reagan's exception for strikes against valid military targets. 
The Clinton administration employed airstrikes and cruise mis-
siles more frequently than its predecessors to strike directly at foreign 
leaders. President Clinton used force against Saddam several times, 
first in 1993, when he employed a barrage of Tomahawk missiles to 
destroy Iraqi intelligence headquarters in retaliation for a plot to kill 
former President George Bush,l79 Then, in 1998, Clinton struck at the 
dictator with air raids for forcing weapons inspectors out of Iraq. Ad-
ministration officials commented at the time that the "candles" their 
predecessors had supposedly lit during the Gulf War in hopes that 
Saddam Hussein would be killed would be lit again.180 As one official 
put it, "command and control sites will be targeted and we hope Sad-
dam Hussein is in one ofthem."181 A year later, the U.S. Air Force also 
bombed the home of Thgoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic-des-
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ignated a "command and control" target by NATO-during the 1999 
Kosovo campaign.I82 
However, certainly the greatest effort to kill a specific individual 
has been directed toward U sama bin Laden. This former Saudi na-
tional has been on the United States' "most wanted" list since 1996 
when information linked him to the 1993 attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York. Afatwa, or religious edict, issued by bin Laden in 
1998 which urged all Muslims to kill Americans, and his subsequent 
involvement in the attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa in August of 
1998, the attack against the U .S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000, and the 
September 11, 2001 attacks at the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon have made him the target of a wide range of lethal operations. 
The Clinton administration struck out at bin Laden and his or-
ganization several times, and amended Executive Order 12333 to 
make this task easier. First, in 1998 President Clinton removed from 
the Order's scope the death of a foreign leader that results from a 
counterterror operation.183 He then authorized the use of deadly 
force against bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida organization-with the un-
derstanding that bin Laden might not survive the campaign.l84 
Clinton opted not to strike directly at bin Laden's camps in Afghani-
stan with a risky helicopter raid, choosing instead to bombard them 
with some 60 cruise missiles. 185 However, the Tomahawks reportedly 
missed bin Laden by perhaps as little as two to three hours.186 By the 
end of his term, Clinton's initial timidity had hardened into a greater 
dedicated resolve, and he became more willing to take more risks to 
eliminate bin Laden. In 1999, press reports suggest he authorized the 
CIA to train and equip some 60 Pakistani commandos to enter Af-
ghanistan and either capture or kill bin Laden.187 However, the over-
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throw of Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif by a military coup in 1999 
reportedly forced an indefinite suspension of the operation.188 
The newly elected George W. Bush administration added dra-
matically to its predecessors' efforts to eliminate bin Laden as a threat 
to national security and adopted his elimination as a consuming goal 
of the new Bush presidency after September 11th. In Mid-September 
of 2001, President Bush, supported by a Joint Resolution of Congress 
authorizing him to employ "all necessary and appropriate force, "189 
issued an intelligence finding-an order dictating the use of funds 
appropriated for covert actions.l9° The finding further authorized the 
CIA to attack bin Laden's al-Qa'ida organization. The President 
specifically directed that al-Qa'ida communications, security appara-
tus, and infrastructure be targeted with the assistance of covert action 
teams from the U.S. military.l91 The President's intelligence finding 
authorized the CIA to employ deadly force to achieve these objectives, 
and as one senior Bush official put it, "The gloves are off .... [L]ethal 
operations that were unthinkable pre-September 11 are now under-
way. "192 Although the finding does not specifically exempt the gov-
ernment from complying with Executive Order 12333, the Clinton 
exception for counterterror operations would no longer categorize 
bin Laden's death, should it arise from these covert actions, as an as-
sassination under Executive Order 12333. Targeting bin Laden, the 
head of al-Qa'ida's chain of command and the engineer of a string of 
terrorist attacks, would be legal as an Article 51 self-defense action 
against an imminent threat to the United States' national security. His 
death would not therefore be an assassination unless it resulted from 
one of the methods expressly prohibited by the laws of war. Only 
Bush's own suggestion that bin Laden was ''wanted, dead or alive," 
strays dangerously close to those prohibited means of killing. Were 
the statement more than just a figure of speech, it would constitute 
outlawry, rendering any resulting deaths as assassination under inter-
national law. 
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Since the drafting of Executive Order 12333 in the 1970s, the 
United States has refrained from applying deadly force against foreign 
leadership except in times of war, near war, or imminent threat 
against the nation. And even when such force was applied, the United 
States has typically employed direct and overt means, such as airstrikes 
or cruise missile attacks.· Whether America's new determination to 
eliminate threats by more unconventional means is merely a unique 
response to September II or marks a return toward the Cold War 
practices that gave rise to Executive Order 12333 remains to be seen. 
Although such covert attacks might be illegal in the absence of provo-
cation, in the light of the continuing terrorist threat a state-sponsored 
killing of U sama bin Laden or other terrorist figures would be 
justifiable as an Article 51 action, as well as permissible under estab-
lished exceptions to Executive Order 12333. 
IV. Poucv CoN SID ERA TioNs 
Any suggestion that the United States' formal ban on state-
sponsored assassinations should be revoked must address the poten-
tial policy ramifications that such change would bring. The United 
States presents itself to the world as a "nation of laws, not men," and 
actively promotes the democratic process both at home and abroad. 
American society cherishes the sanctity of life and punishes the use of 
violence to resolve disputes. Assassination, in contrast, was found by 
the Church Committee to be a brutal tool for projecting force that 
was incompatible with the basic democratic values upon which our 
country is built_193 The practice is also widely held by the world com-
munity to be immoral and dangerous to the greater international or-
der. A public repudiation of the assassination ban-despite its mostly 
symbolic nature-would be latched onto by the world press and 
would carry the clear message that the methods of the United States 
are not as noble as the democratic principles it purports to advance. 
This adverse reaction would impair the United States' ability to 
engage in coalition building. In many of the conflict scenarios exam-
ined in this paper, the United States engaged in extensive diplomatic 
campaigns before initiating any military action. Such efforts are a 
crucial foundation for any war-fighting effort-without international 
acceptance and the direct support of other nations in the area of the 
19! CHURCH REPORT, supra note 115, at 1. 
32 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:1 
conflict, the ability of our military forces to secure their objectives 
would be greatly diminished. 
In recent years, the State Department has been very successful in 
forging and maintaining international coalitions from even the most 
unlikely partners. For example, before the Persian Gulf War, the 
United States engaged in a three-month diplomatic blitz that re-
cruited a number of Arab states, including some sympathetic to Sad-
dam's regime, to provide support or even troops. Continued diplo-
matic efforts held the alliance together when Iraqi missiles struck at 
Israel, and Arab partners began worrying that an Israeli entrance into 
the war would remake the conflict into a clash of cultures between the 
West and Islam. In retrospect, the participation and cooperation of 
these states were critical to the success of the war, giving the coalition 
vital international legitimacy and providing military bases from which 
U.S. forces could operate. Maintaining a moral high ground was an 
important factor in recruiting these allies, and this made it easier to 
gain the support of states with whom relations had been tenuous in 
the past. Had the United States repudiated the ban on assassinations 
before this conflict, it is entirely possible that some states, already re-
luctant to enter the war, might have doubted American intentions or 
have been more reluctant to associate with a nation that was willing to 
publicly announce it would adopt such brutal tactics. 
Diplomacy will be especially important in the coming years of 
President Bush's "war on terrorism." In order to pursue its objective 
of bringing Usarna bin Laden and his associates to justice, the United 
States is seeking to create influence in a region that has historically 
been very suspicious of its motives. Maintaining the support of states 
such as Pakistan, that has previously supported the Taliban, and is a 
natural location from which to launch troops into Mghanistan, will be 
crucial in accomplishing that goal. Pakistani President Musharraf has 
proven supportive thus far, but his grip on power is shaky. Fundamen-
talist elements within his nation threaten its stability, and much of the 
populace is opposed to U.S. efforts to find bin Laden, and is deeply 
suspicious that the operation is part of a wider war against Islam. Simi-
lar sentiments are not uncommon in other strategically important 
states, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt. Government and 
media officials alike continue to cite a failure of U.S. "public diplo-
macy" as the reason of this deep mistrust because the United States 
has neither made any effort to explain its actions, nor sold the validity 
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of the campaign to those who can affect it directly.194 Initiating this 
public relations effort by renouncing the ban would be effectively 
shooting it in the foot: regardless of the reality of the American coun-
terterror strategy, publicly stating assassination would be the best way 
to deal with a man whom 82% of Pakistanis think is a "holy warrior"195 
would only feed their suspicions of a western "crusade" against Islam. 
CoNCLUSION 
The removal of Executive Order 12333 is not a practical option 
because the Order does not pose any substantive legal restrictions to 
the military options of the United States, and its repeal would publicly 
damage the reputation of the United States abroad for little gain. Ex-
ecutive Order 12333 effectively allows the United States "to have its 
cake, and eat it too," giving the nation a symbol of its intent to wage a 
jus ad bellum, but also effectively giving the President the flexibility to 
employ the most brutal of tactics should he deem them necessary. 
Critics who suggest the United States should revoke the Order-pre-
sumably because of their belief that it unduly restricts the govern-
ment's options in countering threats to national security-miss the 
reality that there are in fact very few legal impediments to the use of 
assassination. Neither Executive Order 12333 nor customary interna-
tional and treaty law are likely to forbid the use of state-sanctioned 
killing in most of the scenarios that the United States would consider 
using it. 
As an Executive Order, the implementation and enforcement of 
Executive Order 12333 is left entirely to the pleasure of the President. 
Should he determine that the Order restricts his ability to uphold his 
oath to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States," he could at any time amend, revoke, or temporarily suspend 
Executive Order 12333 so as to allow whatever use of force he sees fit. 
Even when it remains in effect, the two exceptions created by Presi-
dents Reagan and Clinton have narrowed its scope by excluding 
deaths resulting from strikes on valid military targets or counter-
terror operations. Furthermore, should the President wish to keep an 
alteration of Executive Order 12333 away from the eyes of the enemy 
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and the American public for tactical reasons, he could conceal it un-
der the shroud of the classification regime. 
Similarly, international law supplies little in the way of barriers in 
all but a very limited number of circumstances. During wartime, com-
batants may validly strike at any combatant or member of the military 
chain of command, provided no treachery or outlawry is used. Al-
though in theory the peacetime restrictions prohibiting all state-
sponsored political killings are much stricter, in practice there are 
several major loopholes. First, is the continuing difficulty in overcom-
ing the ambiguity and relativism of the term "political" which allows 
states to characterize their actions as they see fit. Second, there are a 
number of specific situations in which the law of war controls, even if 
no formal state of war exists. States may act in self-defense when they 
are attacked, and under the Caroline standard and broad interpreta-
tions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, states can probably also act pre-
emptively to eliminate threats to their national security before any 
actual attack occurs. 
Mter examining the United States' recent history of military ac-
tion, it seems that the typical strategy of our government during the 
past twenty-five years rarely, if ever, is prohibited by either domestic or 
international law. When dealing with rogue dictators or terrorists such 
as Saddam Hussein or Usama bin Laden, the United States has consis-
tently employed aerial bombardment and cruise missile attacks to 
strike at them directly. As each was an attack against a military target 
or a counterterror operation, any resulting deaths would not be con-
sidered assassinations under the Clinton and Reagan exceptions to 
Executive Order 12333. Under international law, missiles and bombs 
are not deemed treacherous, and their use does not constitute out-
lawry. Although the United States did not strike under a formal decla-
ration of war, in each case it responded either to a threat of attack or 
an actual attack against it or another state. Both of these situations 
would justify the use of force as a matter of self-defense under Article 
51 of the U.N. Charter. 
